When slinging epiphenomenonal mud around we find its use most common in the philosophy of mind. Consciousness is argued to be a byproduct an epiphenomenom of the physical brain. Along these sane lines I charge explanation with the same parasitic relationship reducing explanation to a mere epiphenomenom of mental perturbation.

One may remonstrate that explanations are actual characterizations of cause and effect relationships. At countenance, this seems to be the case as when one experiences an attenuation in perturbation when the mind seems to settle on a particularly effective explanation. However, this chimeral quality of explanation can be explained away (thereby reducing my perturbation) by realizing that explanations operate by reducing the perturbation of some phenomenological event. A close analysis shows that the most effective explanations are the ones that can consistently be employed over time to eliminate the same mental perturbation. As in the case of placing one's hand over a flame and getting burned. The singeing of flesh generates mental perturbation, that the language center will attenuate with the explanation that the flame causes flesh to burn. Over time, the mental perturbation associated or linked (1) to scorched flesh will be eliminated by the explanation that flame burns flesh resulting in my avoidance of such flames to naked skin. Because this explanation has been able to consistently eliminate the mental perturbation caused by the phenomenological event we are hoodwinked into thinking that the explanation 'fire causes physical discomfort' is true and has an actual characterization of the 'physical world'. Explanations have the illusory quality of being actual only because they are able to consistently allay some mental perturbation particularly in the case of future events. That is teh can predict the future.

Explanations not only work their magic by eliminating or reducing future instances of some specific mental perturbation, but are also effective in eliminating mental perturbations experienced in the present. In this case, the verbal manifestation of the mental perturbation is a grouse. One can allay mental perturbation when they gripe about that perturbation, which they script as a cause and effect relationship. The girlfriend laments "I am so unhappy in this relationship because my boyfriend never considers my feelings" or the employee complains "If they ever increased my pay I would enjoy working here more". In both cases, the current mental perturbation is allayed when expressed in a verbal grouse. Additionally, this grouse attempts to characterize some type of cause and effect relationship and since this grousing attenuates the mental perturbation, the explanation is seen as a fair characterization of this cause and effect relationship.

An explanation's chimeral quality as the actual delineation of some cause and effect relationship is derived by its ability to attenuate the mental perturbation that prompts such an explanation. However, it is clear that in all cases the explanation is not the actual characterization of the cause and effect relationship. For example, suppose a particularly strong perturbed individual is still perturbed even after development of the flame explanation to characterize the cause of his mental perturbation. He demands to know how or why (same thing) the flame generates the mental perturbation. In this case, we see that the 'flame' explanation is no longer able to explain why this individual experiences the mental perturbation of flesh singeing. Instead, he argues that the cause of his mental perturbation is the excitation of molecules on his skin surface that trigger neural impulse to the brain that cause the mental perturbation. In fact, a flame that is unable to trigger these impulse will not cause the mental perturbation. It could be easily said that for him the flame is not the cause of the mental perturbation but neural impulses are.

Now then we see the problem with explanations. In one case the 'flame' explanation is suitable, and no further prodding is necessary in understanding why such mental perturbation is generated. However, in another case we see that the a particularly difficult individual (scientist) is not allayed by the 'flame' explanation, and develops another 'the neural impulse' explanation to eliminate the mental perturbation. We have two competing explanations for what causes the mental perturbation of singed flesh. Notice though that what determines the 'correct' characterization is not a matter of determining the 'actual' characterization of the cause and effect relationship. What determines for an individual the correct explanation, is a matter of perturbation reduction. Whichever explanation is able to eliminate the perturbation, will determine the 'actual' cause and effect relationship of that person. Explanations are not actual characterizations of some cause and effect relationship, but are verbal manifestations of some brain mechanism able to allay mental perturbation. Explanations are epiphenomenonal having no actual relationship with the cause and effect relationship that results in perturbation, but rather a byproduct of a verbal brain mechanism initiated when the brain state becomes perturbed.

Similar perturbations shared by multiple individuals can potentially all be assuaged by one explanation. In fact, communities of people are built around this fact. This is most obvious the case in religious factions. Schisms occur when a several people in the community begin to find their current perturbations unassuaged by the explanations provided by their religious sect. In time, they begin to develop new explanations for their harsher mental perturbations eventually causing difference between them and the original community. A split will occur and those in the community will separate as a function of which explanation is most capable of attenuating their perturbation.

The founding father of science came from strong religious institution that simply failed at explaining multiple perturbations, which we now consider to be topics of the natural world. Instead they developed their own explanations creating terms like 'gravity', 'atoms', 'force' and so on. Others with this same perturbations will be inclined to agree to scientific theories when they experience the elimination of those same perturbations when employing these terms. In this sense, science is only true so long as its able to eliminate the perturbations that fellow scientist have about the some given topic. Science is not a portrayal of the 'true', 'actual', 'natural' or 'real' world, its simply a set of explanation used by one set of people to eliminate their perturbations. Their explanation on any given topic are no more true then the priests explanation provided that both explanation are able to eliminate the perturbation for the individual.

A fissure in the scientific community strongly reveals the epiphenomenal quality of explanation. When two competing explanation are used by discrete sects within a given scientific community a question must be asked. If the competing theories purported to explain some phenomenon in fact are explaining such a phenomenon, how can their be competing explanations? Implied in this question is the notion that science is interested in finding the actual explanation of any given phenomenon. This has to be the case if science's endeavor is to find the 'truth' about the natural world. Any given phenomenon can have only one actual explanation and so science's ultimate criteria in discerning between differing explanations, is the explanation that most accurately characterize the phenomenon. But with the formation of discrete groups explaining the same phenomenon differently implies a criteria different from one explanation one phenomenon. Clearly the case must be made that they are selecting an explanation based on its ability to attenuate the perturbation the phenomenon invokes in themselves. This is why their can be division in scientific communities, one explanation can attenuate for one group and fail to do so in another group. Scientist aren't developing actual explanations of the natural world but instead are developing explanations that are able to reduce their perturbation. In this sense, they are not even developing explanations, as explanations are a function of perturbation, a mere byproduct of being frustrated by something. Scientific work is the work of experiencing fantastic tales capable of reducing the current the perturbation they experience.